Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&D Investment by Toole, Andrew A. & Czarnitzki, Dirk
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Toole, Andrew A.; Czarnitzki, Dirk
Working Paper
Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty,
and R&D Investment
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 06-056 [rev.]
Provided in cooperation with:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Suggested citation: Toole, Andrew A.; Czarnitzki, Dirk (2008) : Patent Protection, Market
Uncertainty, and R&D Investment, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 06-056 [rev.], http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/24705Dis  cus  si  on  Paper  No.  06-056
Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, 
and R&D Investment
Dirk Czarnitzki and Andrew A. TooleDis  cus  si  on  Paper  No.  06-056
Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, 
and R&D Investment
Dirk Czarnitzki and Andrew A. Toole
Die  Dis  cus  si  on  Pape rs  die  nen  einer  mög  lichst  schnel  len  Ver  brei  tung  von 
neue  ren  For  schungs  arbei  ten  des  ZEW.  Die  Bei  trä  ge  lie  gen  in  allei  ni  ger  Ver  ant  wor  tung 
der  Auto  ren  und  stel  len  nicht  not  wen  di  ger  wei  se  die  Mei  nung  des  ZEW  dar.
Dis  cus  si  on  Papers  are  inten  ded  to  make  results  of  ZEW   research  prompt  ly  avai  la  ble  to  other 
eco  no  mists  in  order  to  encou  ra  ge  dis  cus  si  on  and  sug  gesti  ons  for  revi  si  ons.  The  aut  hors  are  sole  ly 
respon  si  ble  for  the  con  tents  which  do  not  neces  sa  ri  ly  repre  sent  the  opi  ni  on  of  the  ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06056.pdfNon-technical Summary 
The main reason governments grant patent protection is to spur innovation.  Patents 
give inventors temporary monopoly rights that allow them to appropriate a greater 
share of the returns from their innovations and this augments private incentives to 
undertake research and development (R&D) investment. Consequently, patent 
protection should stimulate private R&D investment.   
Drawing on real options investment theory, this paper highlights one mechanism 
through which patents may improve appropriability and stimulate R&D investment – 
by reducing the effect of market uncertainty on the firm’s investment decision.  The 
real options framework predicts that greater uncertainty about market revenues 
reduces investment in irreversible capital by increasing the value of waiting.   
A patent may protect the firm from market competition due to, among other things, 
imitation by rivals.  This reduces the patenting firm’s sensitivity to market 
uncertainty, decreases the value of waiting, and leads to greater current R&D 
investment.  If patent protection mitigates market uncertainty, R&D investment by 
patenting firms should be less responsive to revenue volatility than non-patenting 
firms.   
Our regression analysis tests this hypothesis. We find that R&D investment by non-
patenting firms falls in response to market uncertainty measured by revenue volatility 
while firms with patent protection have no significant response.  To date, this 
mechanism has not been examined in the literature but it may prove to be a fruitful 
approach to estimating the R&D incentive effects of patent protection, an indirect 
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Abstract 
Real options investment theory predicts current investment falls as 
uncertainty about market returns increases.  In the case of R&D investment, 
which is usually considered an irreversible form of investment, this effect 
should be quite pronounced.  This paper tests the real options prediction 
about the R&D investment–uncertainty relationship and further considers 
how patent protection influences this relationship.  Patent protection, by 
limiting the threat of market rivalry, should mitigate firm-specific 
uncertainty and stimulate current R&D investment.  Our empirical results 
support both the prediction of real options theory and the mitigating effect 
of patent protection. 
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1  Introduction 
The main reason governments grant patent protection is to spur innovation.  Patents give 
inventors temporary monopoly rights that allow them to appropriate a greater share of the 
returns from their innovations and this augments private incentives to undertake research and 
development (R&D) investment.  Consequently, patent protection should stimulate private 
R&D investment.  However, the size of the R&D stimulus from patent protection is far from 
clear since it depends on how effective patents are as a mechanism for appropriating returns. 
Drawing on real options investment theory, this paper highlights one mechanism through 
which patents may improve appropriability and stimulate R&D investment – by reducing the 
effect of market uncertainty on the firm’s investment decision.  The real options framework 
predicts that greater uncertainty about market revenues reduces investment in irreversible 
capital by increasing the value of waiting to invest (Pindyck 1991; Dixit 1992; Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994).  R&D investment is highlighted in this literature as a particularly relevant 
example of irreversible capital since a large proportion of R&D supports the salaries of 
research personnel and cannot be recouped if projects fail.  Firms can avoid large losses by 
waiting for new information about market conditions and forgoing investment when this 
information is unfavorable.  This would lower current R&D investment.  Alternatively, a 
patent may protect the firm from market competition due to, among other things, imitation by 
rivals.  This reduces the patenting firm’s perceived level of market uncertainty, decreases the 
value of waiting, and leads to greater current R&D investment.   
In this paper, we undertake an empirical analysis to investigate the evidence supporting 
the real options investment theory and the interaction between uncertainty and patent 
protection for firm-level R&D investment.  Specifically, we examine two questions.  First, do 
firms reduce current R&D investment in response to higher perceived levels of market   2
uncertainty as predicted by real options investment theory?  Second, does patent protection 
mitigate the firm’s response to market uncertainty?  If patent protection mitigates market 
uncertainty, R&D investment by patenting firms should be less responsive to revenue 
volatility than non-patenting firms.  Our regression analysis examines these hypotheses using  
panel data on innovative firms in Germany’s manufacturing sector.   
We find that firm-level R&D investment falls in response to higher levels of uncertainty 
as perceived through revenue volatility.  Consistent with the orientation of R&D investment 
toward innovation, it is revenue volatility in the firm’s new product markets that reduces 
R&D investment and not revenue volatility in the firm’s established product markets.   
Moreover, we find that patent protection mitigates the influence of uncertainty.  R&D 
investment by patenting firms is less responsive to revenue volatility in new product markets 
than R&D investment by non-patenting firms.  Even among patenting firms, R&D investment 
by those firms holding more patents is less sensitive to uncertainty.  Our models control for 
access to internal and external capital, non-diversifiable risk at the industry level, and a 
variety of other potential determinants of R&D investment.  The panel data models account 
for firm specific effects that may influence investment such as firm-level risk aversion or 
unobserved heterogeneity in managerial practices.  
The next section of the paper provides a brief review of the prior literature on the 
investment-uncertainty relationship.  Section 3 discusses the data and measurement of 
uncertainty and other covariates.  Our econometric approach and the results are presented in 
section 4 and concluding remarks appear in section 5.  
2  Literature and Hypotheses 
The relationship between investment and uncertainty is an important ongoing topic of 
research in both the theoretical and empirical literatures.  In the theoretical literature, Abel et   3
al. (1996) show that investment decisions involve the acquisition or exercise of 
“reversibility” and “expandability” options.  The reversibility option captures the value of 
opportunities and costs associated with disinvestment at some point in the future.  The 
reversibility option increases the incentive for current investment when future returns are 
uncertain since the firm acquires this option by purchasing capital.  On the other hand, the 
expandability option captures the value of opportunities and costs associated with investment 
at some point in the future.  This option decreases the incentive for current investment when 
future returns are uncertain since the firm acquires this option by delaying the purchase of 
capital.  Since these options have offsetting effects on the incentive to invest, their model 
shows that the net effect of uncertainty on current investment is theoretically ambiguous. 
(Butzen and Fuss 2002, Carruth et al. 2000, Lensink et al. 2001 provide reviews of the 
theoretical and empirical literatures emphasizing physical capital investment.) 
The type of the capital being considered for purchase will partly determine the nature of 
the options facing the firm and potentially resolve some of the theoretical ambiguity.  For 
instance, research and development is typically considered in the literature as an investment 
that has no (or extremely small) reversibility option but has a significant expandability 
option.  R&D investment is often characterized as completely irreversible (see, for instance, 
Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 424) since these expenditures are directed toward the salaries of 
research personnel and the purchase of task-specific equipment and materials.  When 
irreversibility is combined with uncertainty over future returns and the opportunity to delay 
investment, only a positive expandability option exists and this implies the optimal 
investment trigger is greater than the trigger given by the traditional net present value rule.  
Since the value of the expandability option increases in the level of uncertainty, the incentive   4
for current investment is lower at higher levels of uncertainty.  This suggests a negative 
relationship between the current level of R&D investment and uncertainty.
2   
The type of capital investment also influences the nature of the uncertainty relevant to 
the investment decision.  Private R&D is generally regarded as investment in knowledge 
producing activities aimed at the discovery and introduction into use of new products and 
processes.  Uncertainty about future market returns to innovation will play a critical role in 
the decision to invest in R&D.
3  For instance, when new products are introduced into the 
marketplace, firms are uncertain about the acceptance by potential customers, the reliability 
of suppliers and production operations, and the reaction by rival firms.  When these 
uncertainties are high, expandability options suggest R&D investment will be delayed.  This 
leads to our first hypothesis.
4   
 
H1:  The level of current R&D investment falls as the degree of uncertainty about 
returns to innovation increases. 
 
One of the most significant sources of uncertainty about the returns to innovation is the 
competitive reaction upon introduction into the marketplace.  While there are a variety of 
actions firms may take to reduce competitive uncertainty, obtaining legal protection through 
                                                 
2 Subsequent theoretical research has explored issues related to the firm’s opportunity to delay investment.  
When investment has strategic value, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) show the value of growth options increase 
with the level of uncertainty and offset (at least partially) the affect of expandability options on the incentive for 
current investment.  Weeds (2002) considers a real options model with R&D competition and finds equilibrium 
outcome depends on the balance between the value of delay and the expected benefit of pre-emption.  In a 
recent contribution, Novy-Marx (2007) finds that investment decisions are delayed in a perfectly competitive 
market when firm-level opportunity costs and heterogeneity are important.   
3 Pindyck (1993) presents an alternative model with uncertainty about costs.  He finds that higher technical 
uncertainty leads to earlier investment while higher input cost uncertainty leads firms to delay investment.   
4 Our literature search identified two prior studies examining the relationship between R&D investment and 
uncertainty.  Goel and Ram (2001) examine a panel of OECD countries and measure uncertainty using the 
standard deviation of each country’s inflation rate.  They find that uncertainty reduces the share of R&D in 
GDP.  Minton and Schrand (1999) find that cash flow volatility is associated with lower levels of R&D 
investment using a sample of public companies drawn from Compustat.   5
the patent system figures prominently.
5  By obtaining a patent firms prevent current and 
potential competitors from selling an imitation of their innovation which protects their 
revenue stream from business stealing effects.  The idea that patent protection increases a 
firm’s ability to appropriate the returns from their innovations is commonplace in the 
literature.  The question that has received the most attention is how effective patent protection 
is as a means for appropriating returns.
6  To the degree that patent protection is effective, 
obtaining a patent should reduce the effect of market uncertainty on the firm’s R&D 
investment.  This leads to our second hypothesis. 
H2:  Patent protection mitigates the effect of uncertainty about the returns to 
innovation and increases the level of current R&D investment. 
 
3  Empirical Set-up and Data 
3.1  Set-up 
As outlined above we are interested in the relationship of R&D investment and market 
uncertainty and how patent protection may influence this relationship. Thus, we estimate a 
model of the form 
(1)  () R&D Uncertainty,Patenting,Uncertainty×Patenting,SystematicUnc.,Controls f =  
                                                 
5 Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) discuss the various economic theories for patent protection and review some of 
the early empirical literature. 
6 This observation is the starting point for a large theoretical and empirical literature that cannot be summarized 
in this paper.  The empirical literature uses either survey data or patent renewal data to shed light on differences 
in patent effectiveness or patent value (see, for instance, Pakes 1986). The literature examining the relation 
between patents and firm value is surveyed in Czarnitzki et al. (2006).  Also, since patenting involves the 
disclosure of information, the firm’s decision to patent represents a tradeoff between monopoly rents and 
disclosure.  Thus, patents do not unambiguously induce R&D investment.  Arora et al. (2007) discuss this issue 
and Cohen (2005) surveys the arguments and evidence on appropriation.   
   6
In equation (1), hypothesis one predicts that firm-specific uncertainty about future market 
returns reduces investment. The interaction term between uncertainty and patenting is used to 
test hypothesis two.  A positive and significant coefficient on this term shows that firms with 
patents perceive less uncertainty about future market returns and invest more in current R&D 
investment.  Patenting, which is the firm’s patent stock, is a control variable in this analysis,  
but it is shown explicitly in equation (1) to highlight that we control for firm-level innovative 
“capabilities” which are typically associated with growth options (Kulatilaka and Perotti 
1998).  Likewise, we explicitly show non-diversifiable (or systematic) market uncertainty at 
the industry level in equation (1) to highlight that a CAPM type influence of uncertainty on 
investment is held constant. 
One important component of our empirical model is the measure of firm-specific 
uncertainty about future market returns to innovation.  As mentioned in the last section, firms 
may perceive uncertainty about market returns along a number of dimensions.  To be 
completely consistent with theory, one would like a forward-looking measure of firm-specific 
uncertainty.
7  Because past experience is one of the most important mechanisms for learning, 
a reasonable proxy can be constructed based on the firm’s past market experience as 
innovators.  We use revenue volatility from past market introductions as our proxy for firm-
specific uncertainty.  Consequently, we assume that past market experience is informative 
about how firms perceive uncertainty going forward.  Their market experience as innovators, 
however, is not the same as their market experience with established products, which rely on 
more stable demand and supply relationships.  Thus, we generate two firm-specific 
                                                 
7 In the empirical literature studying the relationship between investment in physical capital and uncertainty 
researchers have used a variety of measures, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.  Carruth et al. 2000 
and Lensink et al. 2001 review these.  Following Leahy and Whited (1996), three recent studies use stock 
market volatility measures of uncertainty for publicly traded firms (Baum et al. (2007), Bloom et al. (2007), 
Bulan (2005)).  Most of our firms are privately owned and not traded in the public market.  Consequently, this 
type of uncertainty proxy is not possible in our context.   7
uncertainty measures using the coefficient of variation of past sales revenue, one capturing 
uncertainty related to innovation (UNC_NEW) and the other capturing uncertainty related to 
established products (UNC_OLD).  This allows for two separate sources of uncertainty to 
affect R&D investment.  
Our uncertainty measures are calculated as coefficients of variation of past sales 
revenues at the firm level.  In order to adjust sale volume for firm size effects, we rescale past 
sales revenues by the number of employees. The number of observations available for 
calculating the coefficients of variation for each firm depends on available pre-sample data 
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where R denotes the volume of new or established product sales of firm i in year t and L 
refers to the number of employees. 
3.2  Data 
Our main data source is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which is a business 
survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim 
(Germany) since 1992. In addition to the survey data, we collected information on the 
patenting activity from the German Patent and Trademark Office. This database covers all 
German (including EPO priority applications with German coverage) since 1978. Finally, we 
use credit rating information from Creditreform (the largest German credit rating agency) to 
gauge firm-level access to external financial capital, a control for potential financial 
constraints.   8
In our study we are able to use panel data from 1995 to 2001 from the MIP survey.  The 
earlier years from 1992 and 1994 are needed to calculate lagged variables such as the 
uncertainty measures and the control variables described below. As our main uncertainty 
measure is derived from new product introductions, we base our analysis on product 
innovators in the manufacturing sector.  An innovative firm is defined to be a company that 
introduced at least one new product in the past.  The phrase “in the past” refers to the pre-
sample period (3 to 9 years) which is used to generate our empirical proxies before the firm 
enters our panel database as an observation.  
The database for our empirical analysis is constructed from firm-year observations.  
For example, suppose the dependent variable (R&D investment) is observed in 2001.   
Because we require past information on new product sales to generate our uncertainty 
measure, the firms must be observed as a product innovator in the past.  Due to the fact that 
the MIP is based on a survey, firms do not always respond in every year so that the panel 
structure is unbalanced.  We require that the firm is observed at least three times before the 
corresponding year t.  If that applies, we calculate our uncertainty measures as described 
above (coefficient of variation of new product sales and established product sales). This 
procedure is applied for every firm-year and leads to a final sample of 2,947 observations 
corresponding to 881 different product innovator firms.  The panel structure is unbalanced: 
21% of firms are only observed twice, 23% three times, another 21% four times, and the 
remaining 36% are observed between 5 and 7 times. Note that we performed robustness tests 
of the regressions presented below by restricting the time window used for the calculation of 
historical variables from three to six years. This did not affect any of the findings we present 
in the next section.  Hence, we do not present results from these regressions. 
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure at the firm level (RDi) in millions of 
“Deutsche Mark” DM (1.95583 DM = 1 EUR).  Although we consider only previous product   9
innovators, we find that about one third of the firm-year observations on R&D have a value 
of zero.  This is due to the fact that our sample contains many small firms that might conduct 
R&D only intermittently (the median number of employees per firm in our sample is 110).  It 
is also possible, however, that these firms choose not to invest in R&D because of uncertainty 
about their future market revenues, which is consistent with the predictions from real options 
theory (see, for instance, the discussion of hysteresis in Dixit, 1992). Our econometric 
analysis takes this into account by modeling the censored distribution of R&D.  Above zero, 
the distribution of R&D spending is quite skewed and this motivates our logarithmic 
specification (lnR&Di).  Since we cannot take the log of the censored observations at R&Di = 
0, we set those observations to the minimum observed positive R&D value in the sample and 
interpret this observed minimum as the censoring point in the regression models.  
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) suggests a negative relationship between 
non-diversifiable or systematic uncertainty and firm-level investment to the extent that firm-
level returns are correlated with aggregate volatility.  Since our sample has a large proportion 
of private firms, we cannot follow the standard approach of calculating firm specific “betas” 
and constructing a proxy of systematic uncertainty.  As an alternative, we generate an 
uncertainty measure at the 3-digit NACE industry level from official statistics from the 
German government.  We calculate the coefficient of variation for total industry sales 
(UNC_IND it-1).
8  This is included in our regressions as a control for aggregate systematic 
uncertainty that could influence firm-level R&D investment.  We also have annual time 
dummy variables in all regressions to account for macroeconomic shocks affecting R&D 
investment. 
                                                 
8 NACE is the European standard industry classification. As we do not have information about employment at 
this detailed industry level, we do not normalize industry sales by the number of employees, but the number of 
firms active in that industry in a given year.  10
Another potential confounder in the relationship between investment and uncertainty 
is the risk aversion of the firm.  If firms are risk-averse, then investment is expected to fall as 
uncertainty increases.  To control for this possibility, we observe that each firm’s risk 
preferences should be strongly reflected in its recent innovation strategy.  That is, firms with 
an aggressive product innovation strategy should be the least risk-averse firms, while those 
following a conservative innovation strategy should be the most risk-averse.  We include a 
control variable in the analysis for the firm’s relative innovativeness in its industry.  The 
firm’s relative innovativeness (PASTINNO) is calculated using its average share of new 
product sales relative to its industry in the pre-sample period (the same period over which we 
calculate our uncertainty measure).  In addition, the firm-specific effect in the panel data 
models should also control for risk preferences to the extent these are time constant in our 
sample period.   
To control for firm-level innovation capabilities we use the firm’s lagged patent stock, 
PSTOCKit-1, where this is calculated from the patent database for each firm since 1978 using 
a 15% annual obsolescence rate of knowledge (see e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1984, or Hall, 
1990, for details).  As mentioned above, it controls for a firm’s prior patenting success and 
R&D capabilities which are expected to stimulate current R&D investment due to either 
productivity differences or perceived grow options.  
To test hypothesis two, we use a patent dummy variable interacted with uncertainty.  
This variable, called D(PSTOCKi,t-1>0), identifies firms with patent protection in the pre-
sample period.  It captures differences between the group of patenting firms and non-
patenting firms in their perception of the influence of uncertainty on R&D investment.  In the 
results section, we also present regressions using different percentiles of the patent 
distribution as a robustness check since one might be concerned that selection into patenting 
in the past somehow reflects unobserved differences between patenting and non-patenting  11
firm.  The firm-specific effects in the panel models should also help alleviate concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity.     
Market type and the degree of competition may also influence the firm’s investment 
decision.  We control for market type using ten industry dummy variables.  To measure the 
degree of competition, we include each market’s seller concentration using the Herfindahl 
index based on shares of total market sales at the 3-digit NACE level, ln(HHI).
9  
With regard to other firm characteristics, we include controls for firm size and 
liquidity constraints. The number of employees controls for heterogeneity in size with respect 
to the propensity to conduct R&D.  We include two controls for potential liquidity 
constraints.  For access to external capital, we use the firm’s credit rating, ln(RATING), 
lagged one period.
10  The rating is an index ranging from 100 to 600, where 600 is the worst 
and essentially corresponds to bankruptcy of the firm.  For the availability of internal capital, 
we use a measure of the firm’s average price-cost margin, (PASTPCM), in the pre-sample 
period:
11  
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with PCM = (Sales – staff cost – material cost + R&D) / Sales, 
where the pre-sample period corresponds to the period used for the uncertainty measure.  
                                                 
9 As alternative measure for market power, we also used the market share on the 3-digit NACE industry level. 
As the results never changed, we omit a detailed presentation of regressions using market share instead of the 
Hefindahl index. 
10 For some firms, there was no rating available for the preceding year. In such cases we use ratings from one or 
two years earlier.  
11  See Collins and Preston (1969), or Ravenscraft (1983). Scholars who have used such measures to test for 
financial constraints typically add back R&D to PCM, as R&D is an expense and reduces profits in the period. If 
the firm would have decided not to invested in R&D, PCM would have been accordingly higher and is therefore 
corrected by current R&D in most empirical studies (see e.g. Harhoff, 1998). 
  12
Furthermore, we include a location dummy, EASTi, indicating that the firm is based in 
Eastern Germany. These firms may show different investment behavior, on average, due to 
the German re-unification in 1990. All else constant, such firms may be able to invest more 
into R&D than Western German firms, as the federal government maintained several support 
programs for investment during the 1990s and early 2000s in order to foster the catching-up 
process of the former German Democratic Republic economy. Finally, six time dummies 
absorb macroeconomic shocks that could have affected R&D investment decisions during the 
period under review.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used. Note that all 
time-variant variables enter the right-hand side of the regressions as lagged values, so that 
they can be treated as predetermined. 
 
>>>   Insert Table 1 about here   <<< 
 
4  Estimation Method and Results 
We employ two different models with our panel data, a pooled cross-sectional approach 
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where yit is the dependent variable, xit denotes the set of regressors, β the parameters to be 
estimated, and ci the unobserved firm-specific effect, and uit is the error term. We estimate 
two versions of this model.  First, we assume that ci = 0 and thus the model can be estimated 
as a pooled cross-sectional model where we adjust the standard errors for firm clusters to 
account for the panel structure of the data. The pooled model has the advantage that it is not  13
necessary to maintain the strict exogeneity assumption. While uit has to be independent of xit, 
the relationship between uit and xis, t ≠ s, is not specified (see Wooldridge, 2002: 538).  For 
instance, the model allows for feedback of R&D in period t to the regressors in future 
periods.  In the second version of the model, we apply a random-effects Tobit panel estimator 
so that ci  ≠ 0.  Consistency of the random effects model requires the strict exogeneity 
assumption, that is, the error term has to be uncorrelated with the covariates across all time 
periods.  In addition, the random-effects Tobit requires the assumption that ci is uncorrelated 
with  xit.  Due to these stronger assumptions, we do not necessarily consider the panel 
specification as superior to the pooled cross-sectional results. Rather think of it as a 
robustness check allowing for unobserved firm-specific effects at the cost of more restrictive 
assumptions otherwise. Note that we keep the time-invariant regressors (EAST and industry 
dummies) in the random-effects panel model in order to reduce the error variance of the firm-
specific effect. 
Table 2 presents our regression results. We consider two versions of the empirical 
specification: model A excludes the interaction between market uncertainty and patent 
protection in order to test the idea that market uncertainty reduces R&D investment 
(hypothesis one).  Model B includes the interaction covariate to test hypothesis two that 
patenting mitigates the effect of uncertainty and leads to greater current R&D investment. 
As predicted by real options theory, model A shows that uncertainty about market 
returns significantly reduces firm-level R&D investment.  This finding is consistent with 
prior work on R&D and a larger body of empirical findings on how uncertainty effects 
physical capital investment.
 12  In our analysis, we can distinguish uncertainty as perceived 
from new versus established product markets.  While both variables show a negative sign as 
                                                 
12 See Goel and Ram (2001), Minton and Schrand (1999) and the references in footnote 7.  14
expected, it turns out that that the effect of uncertainty in established product markets is not 
significantly different from zero. The effect of uncertainty in new markets, however, is highly 
statistically significant in both the pooled cross-sectional and the panel models. 
 
>>>   Insert Table 2 about here   <<< 
 
For the control variables in model A, our proxy for systematic risk (UNC_IND) has 
no significant effect.  This suggests that the CAPM mechanism is not an important 
determinant of R&D investment, although the time dummy variables are significant that these 
could be capturing the effect of systematic uncertainty.  Even though there appear to be no 
prior studies of R&D investment to corroborate this result, Leahy and Whited (1996) did not 
find evidence supporting a CAPM effect nor did Bulan (2005) find market or industry 
uncertainty significant for determining irreversible physical investment.  Our control for firm-
level risk preferences (PASTINNO) is significant and shows the expected sign – R&D 
investment increases as firms pursue more aggressive innovation strategies.  The availability 
of internal finance (PASTPCM) increases R&D investment, however, access to external 
financing (ln(RATING)) is not significant.  PASTPCM, however, is not significant in the 
random effects panel models because this variable has little variation over time.  Larger firms 
invest more in R&D and firms with better R&D capabilities invest more. Both the industry 
dummies reflecting differences in investment across market types and the time dummies are 
jointly significant in all regressions. The EAST dummy is positively significant suggesting 
that firms in the Eastern part of Germany invested more – all else constant – during the late  15
1990s and early 2000s. As outlined above, this may be due to government support 
programs.
13 
Model B allows the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment to differ across 
patenting and non-patenting firms.  The interaction variable is positive and significant.  This 
shows that R&D investment by patenting firms is less sensitive to uncertainty in new product 
markets than non-patenting firms.  Patenting, however, does not completely offset the 
influence of uncertainty on R&D investment.  This is expected since patent protection 
reduces perceived uncertainty about competitive rivalry but does not address other forms of 
uncertainty that might be important such as customer acceptance or supplier and production 
shocks.
14,15   
In order to evaluate the magnitude of the estimated uncertainty effects, we calculate 
marginal effects using the change in the expected value of Yit = ln(R&Dit) (see Greene, 2003: 
764, for E(Y|X) in the Tobit model). As our model is formulated in terms of log of R&D 
investment, the difference in expected values approximates the growth in R&D upon a 
change in uncertainty: 
(5)  [ ] [ ] |, _ 1 0 % |, _ 0 . 2 6 EY XU N C N E W EY XU N C N E W +− = − . 
Using the model, a 10% increase in uncertainty (taken from the median value of the 
covariates) leads firm to reduce R&D investment by 26%, a sizable impact.      
Schankerman (1998) suggests calculating the “equivalent subsidy rate” (ESR) as a 
measure of the private value of patent rights.  ESR answers the question: “If patent protection 
                                                 
13 The results for the control variables in model B are essentially the same.  To save space, we will not discuss 
them separately.  
14 Using OECD data, Kanwar and Evanson (2003) find that intellectual property rights significantly increase 
R&D investment as a share of gross national product.       16
were eliminated, what cash subsidy would have to be paid to firms performing R&D to yield 
the same level of R&D?” (Schankerman 1998, p. 95).  Using the estimates from model B, we 
conduct a slightly different counter-factual exercise:  if a non-patenting firm responded to 
uncertainty like a firm with patent protection (all else constant), what is the implied 
percentage increase in R&D investment?
16  This exercise suggests that patent protection 
confers a 43% increase in R&D investment. Figure 1 illustrates the difference in expected 
R&D investment as uncertainty increases between patenting and non-patenting firms (all 
covariates calculated at the median). While simple, our 43% ESR estimate for German firms 
is not out of line with other ERS estimates based on completely different methods.  Using 
patent renewal data, Lanjouw (1998) shows simulation results for four West German 
technology groups.  Her ESR estimates range from 11.5% for engines to 75.4% for textiles.
17  
 
>>>   Insert Figure 1 about here   <<< 
 
Robustness tests 
One may be concerned that unobserved differences between patenting and non-
patenting firms are driving our results regarding the mitigating effect of patent protection on 
the firm’s R&D response to uncertainty.  As a robustness check, we split the firms in the 
sample into four groups. Rather than considering only patenting and non-patenting firms and 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 We tested for industry differences in the slope response to uncertainty.  Using a Chi-squared test, we could 
not reject the null hypothesis of equality across the industry coefficients.    
16 The calculation is analogous to equation (5), but instead of using a 10% of uncertainty, we calculate the 
difference in the state of patenting vs. non-patenting using a median firm, all else constant. 
17 Schankerman (1998) discusses a variety of ERS estimates found using patent renewal data.  There appear to 
be fairly substantial differences across countries and technology fields.  We present an estimate for an “median” 
manufacturing firm in Germany between 1995 and 2001.  17
the difference in their reaction to new product market uncertainty, we now estimate four 
different slope coefficients for uncertainty.  The first group refers to non-patenting firms 
(similar to the dummy variable used above): 
Group 1:  PS0_UNC_NEW = UNC_NEW * D(PSTOCK/EMP =0). 
Now, however, we split the patenting firms into three evenly distributed groups according to 
the quantiles of the patent stock distribution.  We estimate three slopes for firms that have a 
low, medium and high patent stock per employee, respectively. Let Q33 (Q67) represent the 
33% (67%) quantile of the observations with positive patent stocks. 
Group 2:  PSLOW_UNC_NEW = UNC_NEW * D(PSTOCK/EMP>0) * D(PSTOCK/EMP <Q33) 
Group 3:  PSMED_UNC_NEW = UNC_NEW * D(PSTOCK/EMP >0) * D(PSTOCK/EMP >Q33)  
            * D(PSTOCK/EMP <Q67) 
Group 4:  PSHIGH_UNC_NEW = UNC_NEW * D(PSTOCK/EMP >0) * D(PSTOCK/EMP >Q67)  
  The rest of the model is analogous to the previous regressions and the results are 
presented in Table 3.  We find that the estimated slope coefficients for these new interaction 
variables decrease monotonically with increasing patent stocks per employee, that is, the 
more patents a firm holds (relative to its size) the less it responds to product market 
uncertainty.  A joint test on systematic differences of the four slope coefficients clearly 
rejects the null hypothesis of equality (see bottom of Table 3).  Therefore, we are confident 
that our earlier finding was not due to any self-selection effect into the patenting group.  It 
turns out that even the size of the patent stock held has an impact on the firm’s sensitivity to 
new product market uncertainty. 
 
>>>   Insert Table 3 about here   <<< 
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As further robustness check, we estimated heteroscedastic models where the variance 
had been modelled group-wise multiplicatively (see e.g. Greene, 2003: 769). We included the 
10 industry dummies and 5 size class dummies (based on employment) in the 
heteroscedasticity term. Although the estimations indicate weak heteroscedasticity, none of 
the results mentioned above changed. Therefore, we do not present these estimations in 
detail. 
We also examined the broader measure of uncertainty: the variation in firms’ total sales. 
However, it was never significant in any regression. This motivated the split into old and new 
product sales volatility. In the literature, scholars often use the standard deviation of firms 
total sales (or standard deviations of similar measures) over time. We estimated all models 
using standard deviations rather than coefficients of variations for the uncertainty measures. 
The results were basically the same. Using the coefficients of variation was simply motivated 
by reduced collinearity among the uncertainty measures.  
5  Conclusions 
This paper examines the how uncertainty about future market returns to innovation 
influences current R&D investment and how this influence is affected by patent protection.  
We highlight one mechanism through which patent protection may improve appropriability 
and stimulate R&D investment:  patent protection reduces the firm’s sensitivity to market 
uncertainty, decreases the value of waiting, and leads to greater current R&D investment.  
Our results show that higher levels of uncertainty reduce current R&D investment with the 
median firm in the German manufacturing sector reducing R&D investment by 26% in 
response to a 10% increase in uncertainty, on average.  However, consistent with a real 
options mechanism patent protection offsets the firm’s sensitivity to uncertainty and leads to 
greater current R&D investment.  Our estimates suggest the ex post private value of patent  19
rights for a median firm in our sample is about 43%, which is in line with prior estimates for 
Germany by Lanjouw (1998) using completely different data and methods. 
As research progresses in this area, it would be beneficial to explicitly model the 
relationship between the usage of intellectual property rights and different forms of 
uncertainty faced by the firm.  Due to data limitations, we are not able to investigate this 
deeply in our setting.  It would be necessary to have long time-series data to calculate 
uncertainty measures and analyze how these interact with the decision to patent and how the 
effectiveness of patenting relates to the reduction of expected market uncertainty. We show 
that the sensitivity to uncertainty is reduced the more patents a firm holds, but we are not able 
to investigate strategic motives for patenting nor how multiple patents held by a firm interact 
with each other.  For instance, it would be interesting to incorporate issues related to patent 
thickets or fencing in more detail.  Furthermore, our uncertainty measures are generated from 
historical data.  While it is reasonable to believe that firms build expectations upon past 
experience, it would be desirable to have an explicitly forward-looking perception of 
uncertainty. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (2974 firm-year observations, 881 firms) 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
R&Dit 9.514 96.347 0  3000
UNC_NEWi,t-1 0.942 0.695 0.009  3
UNC_OLDi,t-1 0.510 0.371 0.011  2.449
UNC_INDi,t-1 0.118 0.105 0.009  1.067
PASTINNOi,t-1 38.778 25.652 0.125  99.167
PASTPCMi,t-1 0.275 0.139 -0.373  0.827
EMPi,t-1 509.322 2493.741 1  45000
D(PSTOCK i,t-1>0) 0.431 0.495 0  1
PSTOCKi,t-1/EMP i,t-1 0.018 0.044 0  0.370
HHIi,t-1 48.379 71.485 3.213  1000
RATINGi,t-1 215.507 66.301 100  600
EASTi 0.375 0.484 0  1
Note: 10 industry dummies and 6 time dummies not presented. 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on ln(R&Dit), 1995-2001, 2974 firm-year observations 












UNC_NEWi,t-1  -4.106***  -3.055*** -4.273*** -3.291  *** 
  (0.334)  (0.314) (0.350) (0.319)   
   0.710**  1.013  ***  UNC_NEWi,t-1  
* D(PSTOCK i,t-1>0)     (0.355)  (0.279)   
UNC_OLDi,t-1  -0.659  -0.458 -0.708 -0.510   
  (0.421)  (0.427) (0.420) (0.427)   
UNC_INDi,t-1  0.356  0.652 0.240 0.597   
  (1.554)  (1.169) (1.547) (1.169)   
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.017*  0.025***  0.018**  0.028  *** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)   
PASTPCMi,t-1 1.931**  1.220  2.008**  1.315   
  (0.971)  (0.971) (0.963) (0.976)   
ln(EMP i,t-1)  1.458***  1.533)*** 1.398*** 1.448  *** 
  (0.098)  (0.100) (0.102) (0.102)   
PSTOCK i,t-1/EMPi,t-1  9.579***  9.426*** 7.750*** 7.037  *** 
  (2.024)  (2.657) (2.100) (2.726)   
ln(HHIi,t-1)  -0.135  -0.009 -0.144 -0.030   
  (0.145)  (0.137) (0.146) (0.137)   
ln(RATING i,t-1) 0.228  -0.207  0.221  -0.182   
  (0.599)  (0.520) (0.597) (0.516)   
EASTi  0.849***  0.887*** 0.886*** 0.960  *** 
  (0.325)  (0.317) (0.325) (0.318)   
Intercept  -13.883***  -13.699*** -13.483*** -13.264  *** 
  (3.678)  (3.086) (3.670) (3.064)   
Joint significance of industry 
dummies (χ
2(10)) 
76.67*** 93.95*** 71.26*** 87.15*** 
Joint significance of time 
dummies (χ
2(6)) 
122.56*** 135.29*** 121.15*** 137.47*** 
Log-Likelihood  -6160.16 -5956.43 -6154.64 -5949.79 
McFadden-R
2  0.146 0.174 0.146 0.174 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
a) Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (881 clusters). 
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New product market uncertainty
E[Y|D(PSTOCK>0)=0] E[Y|D(PSTOCK>0)=1]
 
Note: all other covariates are measured at the median.  26
Table 3: Tobit regressions on ln(R&Dit), 1995-2001, 2974 firm-year observations 
Variable  Pooled Cross-Sectional Tobit
a) Random-Effects Panel Tobit 
PS0_UNC_NEWi,t-1 -4.202***  -3.265  *** 
 (0.346)  (0.319)   
PSLOW_UNC_NEWi,t-1 -3.895***  -2.500  *** 
 (0.519)  (0.414)   
PSMED_UNC_NEWi,t-1 -3.099***  -2.036  *** 
 (0.515)  (0.453)   
PSHIGH_UNC_NEWi,t-1 -2.744***  -1.883  *** 
 (0.610)  (0.606)   
UNC_OLDi,t-1 -0.771*  -0.532   
 (0.419)  (0.427)   
UNC_INDi,t-1 0.463  0.598   
 (1.519)  (1.181)   
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.020**  0.028  *** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)   
PASTPCMi,t-1 2.004**  1.322   
 (0.960)  (0.975)   
ln(EMP i,t-1) 1.411***  1.458  *** 
 (0.101)  (0.102)   
PSTOCK i,t-1/EMPi,t-1 5.029**  5.784  * 
 (2.199)  (3.122)   
ln(HHIi,t-1) -0.153  -0.032   
 (0.146)  (0.137)   
ln(RATING i,t-1) 0.132  -0.204   
 (0.593)  (0.517)   
EASTi 0.885***  0.958  *** 
 (0.324)  (0.316)   
Intercept -12.916***  -13.178  *** 
 (3.679)  (3.098)   








Joint test on difference of slope 
coefficients of UNC_NEW (χ
2(4)) 
10.31** 15.13*** 
Log-Likelihood -6150.66  -5948.90 
McFadden-R
2 0.147  0.175 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
a) Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (881 clusters). 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 ln(R&Dit) UNC_NEWi,t-1 UNC_OLDi,t-1 UNC_INDi,t-1 PASTINNOi,t-1 PASTPCMi,t-1 ln(EMP i,t-1)
PSTOCK i,t-1
/EMPi,t-1 ln(HHIi,t-1)l n ( R A T I N G i,t-1) 
ln(R&Dit) 1.0000     
UNC_NEWi,t-1 -0.5836  1.0000    
UNC_OLDi,t-1 0.0991  -0.2351 1.0000    
UNC_INDi,t-1 0.1151  -0.0295 0.0360 1.0000    
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.2613  -0.5703 0.5045 -0.0434 1.0000   
PASTPCMi,t-1 0.0646  -0.1093 0.0253 0.0407 0.0793  1.0000  
ln(EMP i,t-1)  0.4907 -0.2908 -0.0589 0.0799 0.0807 -0.0930 1.0000  
PSTOCK i,t-1/EMPi,t-1 0.2077  -0.2010 0.0399 0.0299 0.0436  0.0916 0.0364 1.0000  
ln(HHIi,t-1) 0.1635  -0.1415 0.0655 0.2868 -0.0179  0.0327 0.1424 0.0277 1.0000  
ln(RATING i,t-1) -0.1758  0.0805 0.1777 -0.0671 0.0352  -0.1152 -0.4390 -0.0529 -0.0071 1.0000 
EASTi -0.0986  0.0505 0.3237 -0.0350 0.1772  -0.0886 -0.2631 -0.1351 -0.0224 0.3691 